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1 
STATES OF CONTINUITY OR STATE OF 
EXCEPTION? RACE, LAW AND POLITICS 
IN THE AGE OF TRUMP 
Devon W. Carbado* 
This Essay introduces the concept of “states of continuity” to 
caution against an uncritical framing of constitutional law and 
political developments in the age of Trump/Trumpism as a “state 
of exception.”1 I invoke the expression state of exception to stand 
in for the argument on the left that the Trump era will produce a 
set of constitutional and political arrangements that materially 
depart from the constitutional and political frameworks that 
preceded it. Students of Agamben will note one difficulty with this 
claim: As a general matter, proponents of Trumpism do not justify 
their policy initiatives solely on the ground that we exist in a state 
of exception. They frame those initiatives, instead, as part of a 
broader project to “Make America Great Again.”2 To put all of 
this another way, whereas Agamben conceived of the state of 
exception as a moment in which the sovereign naturalizes 
extraordinary measures that subsequently become ordinary 
features of governance,3 political actors in the Trump era achieve 
their social and political goals often (though certainly not always) 
 
 * For comments on or conversations about this Essay, I thank Tendayi Achiume, 
Asli Bâli, Kimberlé Crenshaw, Cheryl Harris, Luke Harris, Daniel HoSang, George 
Lipsitz, Joseph Lowndes, K-Sue Park, Christopher Petrella, and Jothie Rajah. Alison 
Korgan provided terrific research assistance. All errors are my own. 
 1. For a particular framing of the state of exception, see generally GIORGIO 
AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION (Kevin Attell trans., 2005).  
 2. See About the 45th President of the United States Donald J. Trump, 
DONALDJTRUMP.COM, http://www.donaldjtrump.com/about/, (last visited November 18, 
2018) (quoting President Trump and his campaign promise, “We will make America strong 
again. We will make America proud again. We will make America safe again. And we will 
Make America Great Again!”); See also, Lynn Vavreck, Trump’s Approach Is More Like 
Reagan’s Than You Might Think, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 16, 2015), https://perma.cc/B73C-
VUZF; Nell Irvin Painter, Opinion, What Whiteness Means in the Trump Era, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 12, 2016, at SR4.  
 3. See AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION, supra note 1, at 16. 
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through a disavowal of the exceptionality of their measures.4 The 
end result is that while in the world Agamben describes the state 
of exception is legitimized through recourses to a discourse of 
exigency, in the world of Trump/Trumpism the interventions are 
legitimized through recourses to discourses of ordinariness and 
return. 
Though it might be fair to say that Agamben’s account of the 
“state of exception” obscures the degree to which there are always 
already people for whom the state of exception is an “ordinary” 
feature of social life, it strikes me as both important and 
productive to conceptualize and articulate Trump/Trumpism 
through the prism of exceptionalism.5 At the same time, I worry 
that the exceptionalism frame has the potential to effectuate too 
sharp a rupture between a “then”—the political and 
constitutional moment before Donald J. Trump became President 
of the United States—and a “now”—the current 
Trump/Trumpism moment in which we find ourselves. This Essay 
elaborates on what I mean, drawing on the concept of “states of 
continuity” to do so.  
 
*** 
My starting point is to note that a state of exception 
understanding of Trump/Trumpism can easily elide the various 
 
 4. See Erica L. Green, Matt Apuzzo, & Katie Benner, Trump Officials Reverse 
Obama’s Policy on Affirmative Action in Schools, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2018, at 
A1(recounting members of the Trump administration’s response to the reversal of Obama-
era affirmative action policies. A joint letter between the Education and the Justice 
Departments denounced the Obama-era policies as “beyond the requirements of the 
Constitution.” Secretary of Education DeVos wrote, “The Supreme Court has determined 
what affirmative action policies are constitutional, and the court’s written decisions are the 
best guide for navigating this complex issue.” And a senior Justice Department official 
further emphasized that “they were… hewing the department closer to the letter of the 
law”); See also Jaweed Kaleem, Trump Administration Rescinds Obama-Era Policies 
Encouraging Affirmative Action and Backs Race-Neutral School Admissions, L.A. TIMES, 
(July 3, 2018, 5:05 PM), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-affirmative-action-
20180703-story.html.  
 5. Walter Benjamin might have been getting at something like the foregoing idea 
when he suggested that “the state of emergency” that historically has frightened the 
metropole has been the normal state of existence for much of the world. See WALTER 
BENJAMIN, ON THE CONCEPT OF HISTORY (1942); Giorgio Agamben, The State of 
Emergency, in CENTRE ROLAND-BARTHES (2002). Aimé Césaire advanced a similar 
observation, noting that while Europe was surprised by Hitler, Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America were not. See AIM. . . C. . .SAIRE, DISCOURSE ON COLONIALISM (Joan Pinkham 
trans., 2001).  
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conservative projects, and centrist ideological commitments, that 
created conditions of possibility for Trump/Trumpism. Indeed, to 
some extent, Trump/Trumpism is the conservative and middle-of-
the-road liberal chicken coming home to roost. This is certainly 
true with respect to what one might broadly call the constitutional 
law of race. 
Critical Race Theorists in particular have long demonstrated 
the multiple ways in which the Supreme Court has, for some time, 
effectively constitutionalized racial inequality.6 That things could 
get worse—and a lot worse—under Trump/Trumpism should not 
obscure the edifice of constitutional law that preceded the Trump 
regime. This body of law all but ensures the continued 
marginalization of people of color. I am thinking here about 
everything from employment discrimination,7 to voting rights,8 to 
policing,9 to the war on terrorism,10 to access to the courts,11 to 
immigration regulation and enforcement,12 to affirmative action,13 
to mass incarceration and the death penalty.14 Across the 
foregoing domains of constitutional law, the Supreme Court has 
narrowed the scope of constitutional rights, increased the barriers 
to litigating those rights, and diminished the penalties and 
remedies when government officials violate them.15 Thus, even 
 
 6. See Elise Boddie, Adaptive Discrimination, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1235 (2016); Robin 
Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 803 (2004); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation 
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Neil 
Gotanda, A Critique Of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991); Ian 
Haney-Lopez, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779 (2012); Cheryl Harris, Equal 
Treatment and the Reproduction of Inequality, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1753 (2001); Cheryl 
Harris, Limiting Equality: The Divergence and Convergence of Title VII and Equal 
Protection, 2014 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 95 (2014); Darren Hutchinson, Critical Race Histories: 
In and Out, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1187 (2004); Devon W. Carbado, Constitutionalizing 
Inequality (draft on file with author). 
 7. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 
(1976). 
 8. See, e.g., Shelby Country v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
 9. See, e.g, Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
 10. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018); Amna Akbar, National Security’s 
Broken Windows, 62 UCLA L. REV. 833 (2015); Amna Akbar, Policing Radicalization, 3 
UC IRVINE L. REV. 809 (2013); Khaled Beydoun, America, Islam, and Constitutionalism: 
Muslim American Poverty and the Mounting Police State, 31 J. L. & RELIGION 279 (2017). 
 11. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
 12. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).  
 13. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).  
 14. See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).  
 15. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE DOOR: HOW 
YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BECAME UNENFORCEABLE (2017).  
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were the Supreme Court never to decide another case, the scales 
of constitutional law are already tipped heavily in favor of 
maintaining and entrenching rather than ameliorating and 
disrupting racial inequality. Am I suggesting, therefore, that 
nothing is at stake in this moment? No. I am simply urging that 
we ought to take care to note what I will call “states of continuity.”  
By “states of continuity” I mean instances in which systems 
and technologies of power—ideologies, discursive frames, and 
practices—are continuous across, for example, different historical 
periods, different national and geographic boundaries, different 
public and private spaces, different legal and political contexts, 
different political parties, and different social categories.16 When 
Michelle Alexander speaks of the “New Jim Crow,” something 
akin to states of continuity (vis-à-vis the “Old Jim Crow”) is 
plausibly implicated.17 Douglas Blackmon’s account of how 
slavery functioned “by another name” after the formal abolition 
of the institution is arguably an example of states of continuity.18 
Cheryl Harris’s contention that whiteness has functioned “as 
property” across different doctrinal regimes in the United States 
could be framed as a story about states of continuity.19 States of 
continuity might also be at play in Edward Said’s conception of 
Orientalism, a phenomenon that according to Said travels across 
different articulations and instantiations of the “European 
Western Experience.”20 Malcolm X’s suggestion that “racism is 
like a Cadillac, they bring out a new model every year”21 is 
simpatico with what I am calling states of continuity. Similarly, 
Achille Mbembe’s observation that the violence and death of 
Nazism was “the extension to the ‘civilized’ peoples of Europe 
methods previously reserved for ‘savages’”22 could be understood 
as a claim about states of continuity. When Kimberlé Crenshaw 
 
 16. The foregoing is not intended as an exhaustive list. 
 17. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN 
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012).  
 18. DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-
ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLS WAR II (1998) 
 19. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993). 
 20. EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM: WESTERN CONCEPTIONS OF THE ORIENT 
(1997). 
 21. Malcolm X, who worked for a short time as an assembly-line worker in a truck 
factory in Detroit, would articulate that line to his followers. See GEORGE LIPSITZ, THE 
POSSESSIVE INVESTMENT IN WHITENESS: HOW WHITE PEOPLE PROFIT FROM IDENTITY 
POLITICS 183 (2006).  
 22. Achille Mbembe, Necropolitics, 15 PUBLIC CULTURE 11 (2003). 
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asserts that a reform/retrenchment dialectic has marked the 
trajectory of black civil rights,23 she is arguably foregrounding an 
example of states of continuity. Finally, K-Sue Park’s argument 
that the United States has long been a “self-deportation” nation 
in which the government has employed “one common logic” to 
facilitate a range of self-deportation strategies to control and 
discipline “the migration of undesired populations” reflects 
precisely the kind of engagements and contestations—within and 
across the boundaries of history, legal frameworks, political 
parties, and social categories—that enables one to see the various 
mechanisms through and on which states of continuity are 
potentially effectuated.24 
To describe states of continuity in the way that I have is to 
suggest neither the precise and inevitable reproduction of that 
which has come before nor the exact manifestation of particular 
systems or technologies of power across two or more domains.25 I 
am not speaking here of uniformity or something analogous to 
“perfect continuity.” Context—in its most capacious sense—will 
always matter and shape where and how power travels and 
expresses itself. Accordingly, I should be clear to note that the 
concept of states of continuity I have in mind presupposes 
moments of rupture and divergence, or what we might think of as 
“states of discontinuity.” 
Nor am I arguing that there is a totalizing way in which states 
of continutity function. The kinds of continuities one might 
analyze across political party affiliation, social categories, and 
geography will not necessarily map onto the kinds of continuities 
one might analyze across time and institutions. Undoubtedly, 
there are (and will always be) important differences with respect 
to how states of continuity operate, the precise contours of which 
cannot be expressed through the level of abstraction at which I 
 
 23. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and 
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) 
 24. K-Sue Park, Self-Deportation Nation, 132 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
 25. To say, for example, that racism is a continuous phenomenon is to say neither 
that its impacts are the same across racial groups nor that each of the racial groups is 
equally positioned to mobilize the various technologies through which racism is expressed. 
In this respect, my conception of states of continuity reflects the kind of political and 
intellectual sensibility that underwrites Joe Lowndes’s and Daniel HoSang’s notion of 
“racial transposition,” a theory that seeks to map how race and racial meanings travel and 
circulate. See generally DANIEL HOSANG & JOSEPH LOWNDES, PRODUCERS, PARASITES 
AND PATRIOTS: RACE AND THE NEW RIGHT-WING POLITICS OF PRECARITY 
(forthcoming 2019). 
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have introduced the theory.26 At bottom, I am trying to engender 
a sensiblity—a way of thinking and seeing—that presses up 
against and resists acquiescing to the boundaries of various forms 
of compartmentalism—the public/private; the past/present; the 
Republican/Democrat; the national/global, and so on. Finally, I 
should stress again my view that the theory of states of continuity 
I am propounding is not a wholesale repudiation of the theory of 
the state of exception Agamben seemed to have in mind.27 I offer 
states of continuity as a provisional concept to put into sharp relief 
what claims about the state of exception sometimes elide—the 
continuous nature of regimes and technologies of power. In at 
least one sense, the elision of this dynamic of continuity in 
arguments about the state of exception is curious: Agamben’s 
articulation of the state of exception is itself an example of states 
of continuity—that is to say, an example of the degree to which 
across time, national boundaries, political parties, and ideological 
commitments the availability and mobilization of the state of 
exception has functioned as a crucial technology of power through 
which people are reduced to “bare life.”   
To return more specifically to Trump/Trumpism: To say that 
there are continuous dimensions to Trump/Trumpism is not to 
turn a blind eye to the exceptional features of this political 
moment. One might reasonably argue that the expansive view of 
the Executive under Trump/Trumpism, the warehousing of 
children in cages in detention centers, and the proliferation of tent 
camps along the border are salient markers of the state of 
exception at work. I do not mean to quarrel with those accounts. 
My modest intervention is to suggest that those arguments should 
not overdetermine how we think about Trump/Trumpism lest we 
lose sight of the “normal” and more “respectable” conservative 
 
 26.  I leave to others the challenge of articulating what those differences might look 
like. 
 27.  There are other reasons one might challenge various articulations of the state of 
exception, including the extent to which scholars sometimes mobilize the theory without 
attending to race, class, sexuality, and other socially marginilized subject positions (for 
example, one’s position as an immigrant or as an incarcerated person). For critiques of 
Agamben’s work along these lines, see Mark Rifkin, Indigenizing Agamben: Rethinking 
Sovereignty in Light of the “Peculiar” Status of Native Peoples, 73 CULTURAL CRITIQUE 
88 (2009); FALGUNI SHETH, TOWARDS A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF RACE (2009); 
Ladelle McWhorther, Post-Structuralism and Race: Giorgio Agamben and Michel 
Foucault, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF RACE 113 (Taylor et al 
ed.itors).  
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projects through and on which (even the most exceptional 
dimensions of) Trump/Trumpism came into being.  
Though my view is that the racial dimensions of 
Trump/Trumpism have their predicate precisely in those more 
“normal” and “respectable” articulations of conservative 
politics—and in centrist formulations of liberal racial 
commitments—it is beyond the scope of this Essay to articulate 
the full contours of those continuities. But a brief discussion of a 
particular left/right state of continuity might be hepful. The 
example I have in mind has, for over forty years, functioned as 
one of the most hotly contested social policy questions in the 
Unites States—affirmative action. 
 
*** 
Notwithstanding ongoing controversies over affirmative 
action, the policy, paradoxically, has been an arena in which not 
only pre-Trump and post-Trump conservatives ideologically 
converge but also where many liberals and conservatives 
ideologically converge. Across the ideological spectrum, people 
conceptualize affirmative action as a racial preference that we 
should treat suspiciously and rarely, if ever, use. Indeed, as 
Kimberlé Crenshaw has noted, for the most part, the difference 
between liberal and conservative views on affirmative action is 
that while liberals think the preference is justified because the 
policy advances diversity, conservatives think the policy is never 
justified because it instantiates reverse discrimination.28 This state 
of continuity between the left and the right on affirmative action 
provides at least a partial explanation for why Californians—who 
so ardently position themselves against Donald Trump—passed 
Proposition 209, an anti-affirmative action measure that traded on 
the idea that affirmative action undermines core American values 
(like merit and hard work) and harms innocent whites.29 
 
 28. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Introduction to CRITICAL RACE THEORY (1995); 
Kimberlé Crenshaw, Framing Affirmative Action, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 
123 (2007); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Playing Race Cards: Constructing a Pro-Active Defense 
of Affirmative Action, 16 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 196 (2000).  
 29. See CAL. CONST. ART. I, § 31, reprinted in APPENDIX A. The initiative is also 
known as Proposition 209, or the “California Civil Rights Initiative (CCRI).” For an 
analysis of the liberal roots of all of California’s racialized ballot measures dating back to 
the 1940s, see DANIEL HOSANG, RACIAL PROPOSITIONS: BALLOT INITIATIVES AND THE 
MAKING OF POSTWAR CALIFORNIA (2010).  
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Political scientist Luke Harris and philosopher Uma Narayan 
have provided perhaps the most compelling account of the degree 
to which liberals have acquiesced in the preference framing of 
affirmative action.30 That acquiescence is precisely what marks the 
state of continuity about which I have been speaking. It is not my 
aim in this Essay to explain why conservatives and liberals align 
on the preference framing of affirmative action. I am interested, 
instead, in encouraging liberals to opt out of that state of 
continuity. 
That I employ the language of opting out does not rest on the 
view that states of continuity can always be escaped. In some 
instances, the relevant system or technology of power might be, 
to borrow from Daria Roithmayr, fundamentally “locked in.”31 
Think, for example, about racism and American democracy. One 
could argue that the state of continuity of racism across different 
moments in American history is an essential feature of American 
democracy. Under this view, while it absolutely true to say that 
American democracy has, in some moments, evidenced an 
oppositional relationship to racism, it is true as well that 
American democracy has also (and perhaps always) been a 
vehicle through which racism has been expressed.32 Understood 
in this way, it might make little sense to speak in terms of ending 
or escaping the state of continuity between American democracy 
and racism (since the latter has been a core and foundational 
feature of the former) and speak instead in terms of mitigating 
that relationship. 
With respect to affirmative action, this Essay presses the 
language of elimination, not mitigation, at least as a thought 
experiment. My view is that liberals can effectuate a rupture 
between themselves and conservatives by articulating affirmative 
action as a countermeasure rather than a preference. This 
 
 30. See Luke Charles Harris & Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action and the Myth of 
Preferential Treatment: A Transformative Critique of the Terms of the Affirmative Action 
Debate, 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. (1994). 
 31. See DARIA ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING RACISM: HOW EVERYDAY CHOICES 
LOCK IN WHITE ADVANTAGE (2014); Daria Roithmayr, Locked in Inequality: The 
Persistence of Discrimination, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 31 (2003). 
 32. Thus, for example, Derrick Bell’s claim that racism is endemic to American 
society. See generally DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE 
PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1993). That argument is one of the central claims in Critical 
Race Theory. See Devon W. Carbado, Critical What What?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1593 (2011). 
1 - CARBADO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/19 6:42 PM 
2019] STATES OF CONTINUITY 9 
 
possibility exists because, as I have explained elsewhere,33 the 
preference framing of affirmative action trades on several 
normatively and empirically contingent assumptions.34 Suppose, 
for example, that one thought that conventional admissions 
practices reflect a simplistic understanding of race and racism and 
failed to grapple with not only radical conceptions of racial 
inequality—such as racial capitalism35—but relatively modest 
ones, like implicit biases and stereotype threat. From that vantage 
point, one is more likely to view affirmative action as a 
countermeasure that offsets racial disadvantages than as a social 
policy that produces them.36  
Disrupting the state of continuity between liberals and 
conservatives on the issue of affirmative action is important for a 
number of reasons. First, immediately after the election, some 
liberals (and not just conservatives) began circulating essentially 
a blame-the-victim narrative to explain Donald Trump’s 
presidential win: identity politics.37 Their claim, more precisely, is 
that the Democratic Party’s over investment in identity politics, 
particularly race, caused the Democrats to lose the election.38 This 
 
 33. See Devon Carbado et al., Privileged or Mismatched: The Lose-Lose Position of 
African Americans in the Affirmative Action Debate, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 174 (2016). 
See also Devon W. Carbado, Footnote 43: Recovering Justice Powell’s Anti-Preference 
Framing of Affirmative, U.C. DAVIS L.REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
 34. Still, I recognize that one could argue that the perception that any racial 
remediation for African Americans is a preference might be so baked into our national 
consciousness that black assertions of civil rights claims will almost always be framed as 
“special rights.” See Mario Barnes et al., A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967 
(2010) (discussing the extent to the Supreme Court viewed in the late 1800s viewed civil 
rights legislations as “special rights”). 
 35. BLACK MARXISM: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK RADICAL TRADITION. 
(London: Zed Books, 1983) [Republished by UNC Press, 2000, with a new preface and a 
foreword by Robin D.G. Kelley]. 
 36. Carbado et al., supra note 34 (discussing these concepts).  
 37. See, e.g., Mark Lilla, Opinion, The End of Identity Liberalism, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
18, 2016, at SR1; Adam Gopnik, The Democrats and the Seesaw of Identity Politics, NEW 
YORKER (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-democrats-
and-the-seesaw-of-identity-politics. 
 38. See Steve Koppman, Opinion, How Identity Politics Hurts Democrats’ National 
Hopes, MERCURY NEWS (March 10, 2018, 8:45 AM), 
https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/03/10/opinion-how-identity-politics-hurts-democrats-
national-hopes/; Jason L. Riley, A Critique of Identity Politics—From Obama, WALL ST. 
J. (July 24, 2018, 7:07 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-critique-of-identity-
politicsfrom-obama-1532473677; Ed Rogers, Opinion, The Democrats’ Use of the Race 
Card Does Real Harm, WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/post-partisan/wp/2017/11/01/the-democrats-use-of-the-race-card-does-real-harm/
?utm_term=.14268a3f7dd2. But see Ian Haney Lopez and Anat Shenker-Osorio, The 
Answer to GOP Dog Whistles? Democrats Should Talk More About Race, Not Less, 
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racially specific diagnosis of the outcome of the election carried 
with it a racially specific “colorblind”39 prescription: Going 
forward, Democrats should talk less about race and race 
conscious policies, particularly affirmative action, and talk more 
about class and economic anxieties, particularly with reference to 
the white working class.40 
Two points bear emphasis. First, the liberal “colorblind” 
injunction to the left aligns almost perfectly with the normative 
terms on which conservatives contest affirmative action—namely, 
that the policy is divisive and undermines the principle of 
 
WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/the-answer-to-
gop-dog-whistles-democrats-should-talk-more-about-race-not-less/2018/08/22/7cfa4d3a-
a184-11e8-8e87 c869fe70a721_story.html?utm_term=.a663054378f1. To some extent, the 
focus on identity politics in the elections is a part of a broader claim scholars sometimes 
advance about backlash politics. See JOSEPH LOWNDES, FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE 
NEW RIGHT: RACE AND THE SOUTHERN ORIGINS OF MODERN CONSERVATISM (2008). 
 39. See Devon W. Carbado, Why We Should Always Put “Colorblind” in Scare 
Quotes (draft on file with author).  
 40. See David Atkins, It Was Prejudice. It Was Economics. It was Both, THE 
AMERICAN PROSPECT (July 7, 2017), http://prospect.org/article/it-was-prejudice-it-was-
economics-it-was-both; Democrats Will Struggle to Win Back Obama-Trump Voters, THE 
ECONOMIST (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.economist.com/united-states/2017/11/02/
democrats-will-struggle-to-win-back-obama-trump-voters; Ruy Teixeira, The Math Is 
Clear: Democrats Need to Win More Working-Class White Votes, VOX (Jan. 29, 2019 11:20 
AM), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/1/29/16945106/democrats-white-working-
class-demographics-alabama-clinton-obama-base. What’s particularly frustrating about 
the thesis that white working class resentment at identity politics propelled white working 
class people to vote for Donald Trump is that it obscures a point about race and voting 
that reveals a white racial advantage. There has been no voter suppression or 
gerrymandering efforts to dilute the white working class vote. Nor has felony 
disenfranchisement been deployed as mechanism to diminish the voting opportunities of 
white working class Americans. I am not saying that white working class Americans are 
unaffected by voter suppression regimes and felony disenfranchisement. The point is 
rather that the white working class are not the intended targets of those policies. The end 
result is that working class whites get to vote—and vote their racial resentment—while 
African-American access to the franchise continues to be racially circumscribed. For a 
discussion of the extent of the voter suppression problem and the range of tactics that were 
employed, see ARI BERMAN, GIVE US THE BALLOT (2016). A final point worth 
mentioning about the white working class is whether it is fair to attribute the outcome of 
the election to that group. More white women, for example, voted for Donald Trump than 
voted for Hilary Clinton. See Katie Rogers, White Women Helped Elect Donald Trump, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/01/us/politics/white-women-
helped-elect-donald-trump.html. More white men voted for Donald Trump than for Hilary 
Clinton; in short, more white people voted for Donald Trump than they did for Hilary 
Clinton. See Alec Tyson & Shiva Maniam, Behind Trump’s Victory: Divisions by Race, 
Gender, Education, PEW RES. CTR (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2016/11/09/behind-trumps-victory-divisions-by-race-gender-education/. To frame the 
outcome of the election in terms of white working class Americans—rather than white 
Americans writ large—is to obscure the role that whiteness qua whiteness continues to 
play in our electoral politics.  
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colorblindness. Second, while the intra-left critique of the 
elections fashions itself as a race neutral alternative to left-
oriented identity politics, the solution the critique proffers 
expressly calls for Democrats to pay attention to a particular 
racial group: white working-class Americans. In this regard, the 
proposed solution is a striking example of how the racial 
consciousness of a policy or political strategy can be disappeared 
when its intended beneficiaries are white.41 Re-described, the 
anti-identity injunction of some liberals is less a call for 
Democrats to avoid race and more a call that they racially target 
and engage a subgroup of white Americans (again, the white 
working class) via a form of identity politics that we might call 
white identity politics.42 Cheryl Harris refers to racial strategies of 
this sort—the simultaneous reliance and disavowal of identity—
as “anti-identity identity” politics.43 
The liberal move to rely on and disavow race in the context 
of making sense of the elections produced both race and class 
effects. More precisely, the move naturalized whiteness as the 
identity through which working class status acquires social 
intelligibility and naturalized blackness and non-whiteness more 
generally as racial identities through which working class status is 
refused. Put differently, the liberal identity-based explanations 
for the elections denaturalized whiteness as a potential predicate 
for identity politics and denaturalized blackness as a racial 
identity through which working class experiences are lived. Noah 
Zatz’s compelling race and class analysis of the elections 
articulates a version of this point: 
[D]rawing conclusions about class from data about white 
people ignores working  class people of color and consigns 
them to pure “race” voters. It reproduces a racially unmarked 
but implicitly white concept of the working  class, one that is 
especially problematic against the backdrop of racially
 
 41. Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, The New Racial Preferences, 96 CAL. L. 
REV. 1139 (2008) (discussing the ways in which anti-affirmative action initiatives function 
as racial preferences). 
 42. A political iteration of Cheryl I. Harris’s theory of whiteness as property and 
George Lipsitz’s theory of a possessive investment in whiteness are at play here. See 
GEORGE LIPSITZ, THE POSSESSIVE INVESTMENT IN WHITENESS: HOW WHITE PEOPLE 
PROFIT FROM IDENTITY POLITICS (2006); Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993).  
 43. See Cheryl I. Harris, Doubting Thomas and the Anti-Identity Identity 
(unpublished manuscript on file with author) (describing Justice Clarence Thomas’s 
jurisprudence as a n example of anti-identity politics). 
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 stratified stereotypes of  who is and is not “hard working.” 
Using, as has become common, the racially  qualified term 
“white working class” is an improvement, but too often it goes 
 without an accompanying analysis of how whiteness shapes 
class among white  people nor how class matters to people of 
color.44 
The problem here, then, is not only that the category “white 
working class” has representative currency both in the particular 
(as white working class) and in the general (as working class per 
se), but that that currency is achieved by displacing non-white 
working class identities and by positioning whiteness outside of 
and beyond identity politics. 
Which brings me to another reason the anti-identity 
explanation for Trump’s victory is troubling. It ignores more 
obvious causal candidates for Trump’s ascendancy to the White 
House and affirms a standard conservative line about race. These 
other candidates include race-baiting and xenophobia, sexism and 
misogyny, voter suppression, electoral meddling, and a 
compromised Democratic candidate.45 In downplaying these 
 
 44. Noah Zatz, Thinking Intersectionally About Race and Class in the Trump Era, L. 
& POL. ECON. (Nov. 13, 2017), lpeblog.org. 
 45. See OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, ICA 2017-01D, ASSESSING 
RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN RECENT US ELECTIONS (Jan. 6, 2017); G. 
Reginald Daniel & Jasmine Kelekay, Seeking Justice Through Love and Relationships: 
From Loving v. Virginia to Barack Obama: The Symbolic Tie That Binds, 50 CREIGHTON 
L. REV. 641 (2017); Richard L. Hasen, The 2016 U.S. Voting Wars: From Bad to Worse, 26 
WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 629 (2018); Gary C. Jacobson, Polarization, Gridlock, and 
Presidential Campaign Politics in 2016, 667 ANNALS 226 (2016); Erin A. Penrod, 
Disenfranchisement 2.0: Recent Voter ID Laws and the Implications Thereof, 14 U. ST. 
THOMAS L.J. 207 (2018); Abigail Perdue, Man Up or Go Home: Exploring Perceptions of 
Women in Leadership, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 1233 (2017); Juan F. Perea, Making Room For 
More: Echoes of Slavery II: How Slavery’s Legacy Distorts Democracy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1081 (2018); Lindsay Perez Huber, “Make America Great Again!”: Donald Trump, 
Racist Nativism and the Virulent Adherence to White Supremacy Amid U.S. Demographic 
Change, 10 CHARLESTON L. REV. 215 (2016); Michael N. Schmitt, “Virtual” 
Disenfranchisement: Cyber Election Meddling in the Grey Zones of International Law, 19 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 30 (2018); Terry Smith, White Backlash in a Brown Country, 50 VAL. L. 
REV. 89 (2015); Alice Woolley & Elysa Darling, Nasty Women and the Rule of Law, 51 S. 
FLA. L. REV. 507 (2017); Nina Burleigh, The Presidential Election Was a Referendum on 
Gender and Women Lost, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 14, 2016 8:00AM), http://www.newsweek.com
/2016/11/18/hillary-clinton-presidential-election-voter-gender-gap-520579.html; Chris 
Cillizza, Hillary Clinton Has a Baggage Problem, WASHINGTON POST (April 23, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/04/23/hillary-clintons-baggage-
problem/?utm_term=.733ab28e42f2; Andy Greenberg, Everything We Know About 
Russia’s Election-Hacking Playbook, WIRED (June 9, 2017), perma.cc/UU3W-NUGV; 
Jonathan Mahler, Donald Trump’s Message Resonates with White Supremacists, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/01/us/politics/donald-trump-
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explanations and highlighting identity politics, liberals are 
endorsing a version of the conservative argument that engaging 
race in the political or legal arena—for whatever reason—is 
pernicious, dangerous, and balkanizing.46 
Let’s now focus on a second set of concerns that reveal why 
exposing and contesting the state of continuity between liberals 
and conservatives with respect to their views on affirmative action 
is important. We are at the beginning of another wave of 
affirmative action litigation. Both Harvard and the University of 
North Carolina are being sued.47 While the formal constitutional 
terms on which this litigation will be staged is largely set,48 the 
public discourse terms are not carved in stone. This gives liberals 
some space to engage in efforts to reframe affirmative action. I 
am not saying this would be an easy task. On the contrary, any 
attempt at reframing would undoubtedly be an uphill battle. But 
that battle could start ideologically at home, among and between 
 
supremacists.html; Rex Murphy, It Wasn’t Misogyny that Caused Clinton’s Downfall, It 
Was All the Baggage She Dragged Around, NAT’L POST (Nov. 11, 2016), 
http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/rex-murphy-fear-and-loathing-on-the-
campaign-trail-16; Vann R. Newkirk II, How Voter ID Laws Discriminate, ATLANTIC 
(Feb. 18, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/how-voter-id-laws-
discriminate-study/517218/; David Remnick, Hillary Clinton Looks Back in Anger, NEW 
YORKER (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/09/25/hillary-
clinton-looks-back-in-anger; Press Release, White House, Statement by the President on 
Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and Harassment (Dec. 29, 
2016), https://perma.cc/3XXD-8K5C. 
 46. Scholars have described this ideology as it is manifested in Supreme Court 
decision-making as the anti-balkanization thesis. See Darren Leonard Hutchinson, 
Preventing Balkanization or Facilitating Racial Domination: A Critique of the New Equal 
Protection, 22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1 (2015); Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to 
Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE 
L.J. 1278 (2010).  
 47. See Katie Benner, Justice Dept. Backs Suit Accusing Harvard of Discriminating 
Against Asian-American Applicants, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/30/us/politics/asian-students-affirmative-action-
harvard.html; Carolyn Ebeling, Lawsuit Calls UNC Admission Practices Unfair, THE 
DAILY TAR HEEL (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.dailytarheel.com/article/2014/11/lawsuit-
calls-unc-admissions-practices-unfair; Jane Stancill, UNC Has Spent $16.8 Million on 
Affirmative Action Lawsuit, NEWS & OBSERVER (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.news
observer.com/news/local/article216485240.html. Moreover, the Department of Justice is 
investigating Yale. See Brett Samuels, DOJ, Education Depart Launch Investigation into 
Yale over alleged admissions discrimination, HILL (Sept. 26, 2018 1:26 PM), 
https://thehill.com/regulation/408540-doj-education-dept-launch-investigation-into-yale-
over-alleged-admissions. There is every reason to believe that other lawsuits will be 
forthcoming.  
 48. The constitutional question will be whether affirmative action survives “strict 
scrutiny.” See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 136 S. Ct. 
2198 (2016).  
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liberals. And, that minimalist step could mark the beginning of 
the end of this left/right state of continuity, the beginning of the 
end of the convergence between the liberal tepid support of 
affirmative action (“we support affirmative action 
notwithstanding that it is a racial preference because we believe in 
diversity”) and the conservative vigorous repudiation of the 
policy (“we oppose the affirmative action because it is a racial 
preference that is divisive and harms innocent whites”). 
The third reason disrupting the state of continuity between 
liberals and conservatives on affirmative action is important is 
that “affirmative action is a harbinger for racial remediation writ 
large.”49 Stated differently, what happens to affirmative action 
happens to other forms of racial remediation. This is because “the 
Supreme Court works out its ideological and normative views 
about race in the affirmative action context and then exports 
those ideas to other domains of constitutional law.”50 Scholars 
have paid scant attention to this “miner’s canary” dimension of 
affirmative action jurisprudence.51 Thus, they have not considered 
how “affirmative action functions as a kind of diagnostic tool or 
predictive index for the trajectory of racial remediation more 
generally.”52 Nor have scholars noted the degree to which “the 
conservative logics of affirmative action cases have metastasized 
across multiple areas of constitutional law to limit and undermine 
various forms of racial remediation.”53 As it turns out, it is not just 
the rationales underlying the affirmative cases that travel but the 
cases themselves. One sees, for example, the Court citing to 
affirmative action jurisprudence in cases that implicate voting 
rights, employment discrimination claims,54 and K-12 
desegregation.55 
I reference the preceding citational practices not just as a 
push-back against liberals who grudgingly defend affirmative 
 
 49. See Devon W. Carbado, States of Continuity II: How The Supreme Court Deploys 
Affirmative Action to Limit Other Forms of Racial Remediation (draft on file with author) 
 50. Id.  
 51. For an argument about how race can function as a miner canary for other forms 
of social inequality, see LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY 
(2003).  
 52. See Carbado, supra note 49. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Noah Zatz has already drawn out some of the work affirmative action performs 
in the employment discrimination context. See Noah Zatz, Special Treatment Everywhere, 
Special Treatment Nowhere, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1155 (2015). 
 55. Parents Involved in Cmt. Sch. Dist. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
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action because they view the policy largely the way conservatives 
do. I do so as well as a push back against those on the left who 
have sometimes been too quick to give up on affirmative action 
on the view that the policy is too modest. This latter group of 
liberals have failed to realize that it precisely because of the 
radicalizing potential of affirmative action—both the policy itself 
and what its constitutional status portends for other sites of racial 
remediation—that conservatives on and off the Court view 
affirmative action, and the rationales that underlie it, as an 
ideological target of opportunity. On this view, one can expect 
Trump and his supporters to trade on discursive frames 
conservatives deploy to challenge affirmative action (for example, 
the language of “merit”) to advance and legitimize various 




My aim is this Essay was somewhat narrow: to suggest that 
we exercise care with respect to when and how we frame 
Trump/Trumpism as a state of exception. I introduced the concept 
of states of continutity as another way of making sense of our 
current political movement and the constitutional regimes it may 
effectuate. To illustrate a state of continuity at work, I employed 
the example of affirmative action and argued that, by and large, 
both the right and the left conceptualize the policy as a 
preference. I explained why the preference framing of affirmative 
action is normatively and empirically contingent and suggested 
the policy should be understood as a countermeasure to offset 
particular racial disadvantages admissions practices generally do 
not engage. My hope is that the reframing of affirmative action I 
have offered will help to disrupt the state of continuity between 
liberals and conservatives on the policy. That disruption, in turn, 
could help to make affirmaive action and other racial remediation 
projects less vulnerable to attack. 
 
 56. See Deena Flinchum, A Merit-Based Immigration System Would Help 
Americans—and Skilled Foreigners, HILL (Nov. 29, 2017 8:15 AM), 
https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/homeland-security/362227-a-merit-based-
immigration-system-would-help-americans; William A. Galston, The Case for Merit-Based 
Immigration, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 6, 2018 7:29 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-case-
for-merit-based-immigration-1517963380.  
